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ABSTRACT 
This work undertakes an analysis of the methods used in the field of software 
engineering to measure the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering 
project risks.  The purpose of this work is to investigate the viability of the exclusive use 
of quantitative values to measure the probability of occurrence of identified project risks 
within the field of software engineering rather than the qualitative values used in some 
probability of occurrence scales. More specifically, the goal of this analysis is to 
investigate the viability of achieving more precise and less subjective quantitative 
measurements of the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project 
risks with Bayesian probability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Measurement of quantitative entities is best achieved with quantitative numeric 
values.  Identified software engineering project risks are quantifiable entities and 
measuring their probability of occurrence with quantitative numeric values is superior to 
the use of qualitative descriptive values.   
Quantitative numeric values are superior to qualitative adjectives such as “high,” 
“medium,” and “low” for measurement as they are not subjective.  When quantitative 
values are derived scientifically through mathematical probabilistic and/or statistical 
methods and used as intended they are generally not subject to a number of varied, 
subjective interpretations or misinterpretations by those using them.  Quantitative values 
do not require their users to make judgments regarding the intended meaning of the 
measurements that are being applied.   
The use of quantitative numeric values for measurement rather than qualitative 
adjectives will result in the communication of these measurements in a way that is likely 
to be more precise, objective, and clear.  This explains why quantitative numeric values 
are typically used for measurement in the fields of engineering and science. Quantitative 
numeric values are the standard means of communication for measurements of all sorts. 
The use of quantitative values that are derived through a rigorous scientific 
approach that utilizes sound mathematical techniques instead of qualitative values that 
are based upon subjective and/or intuitive judgment for the measurement of the 
probability of occurrence of identified project risks could afford the field of software 
engineering many benefits.  From a software engineering project management 
perspective these include the ability to better prioritize risks, more efficiently allocate 
project risk mitigation resources to identified risks, and, as was previously mentioned, 
communicate the probability of occurrence of identified risks with a medium that is 




The question of why methods that employ qualitative adjectives to measure the 
probability of occurrence of identified risks are sometimes used in the field of software 
engineering is raised.  The matter of whether the software engineering discipline itself is 
suited to the use of qualitative, subjective and/or perhaps less accurate measurement 
techniques should also be considered.  
Both qualitative and quantitative measurement techniques may be found in use in 
the field of software engineering project risk management to measure and communicate 
the probability of occurrence of identified software project risks.  This work will 
investigate the reasons qualitative types are used in the field of software engineering and 
whether quantitative types can and should be used exclusively.   
This primary focus of this work will be to resolve the matter of qualitative 
adjectives being applied to identified software project risks to describe their probability 
of occurrence.  The solution to this matter that will be investigated is the viability of 
replacing the adjective descriptors used in qualitative probability of occurrence scales in 
the field of software engineering with quantitative numeric values.  This is to achieve 
more precise and easily understood probability of occurrence measurements.   
As this work is addressing the measurement of the probability of occurrence of 
identified project risks, a more detailed explanation of each of the definitions of these 
terms should be provided.  Relative to the field of software engineering, definitions of 
“identified software project risks” will be discussed as will the definition of “probability 
of occurrence” measurements.  The value of accurately assessing the probability of 
occurrence of identified software project risks will be discussed in more detail before the 
discussion and presentation of the proposed solution to the problem this work addresses. 
In general terms, a risk is commonly viewed as an event whose occurrence will 
result in some detrimental effect upon individuals and/or entities.  More specifically, risk 
is defined as the “possibility of loss or injury” and also, in a way perhaps more directly 
related to this work, as “the chance of loss or the perils to the subject matter of an 
insurance contract” and also as “the degree of probability of such loss” (Webster’s, 
1998). 
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A software engineering project risk may also be defined and referred to as a 
hazard if it exists in the context of a safety-critical software system.  Safety-critical 
software is defined as “any software that can directly or indirectly contribute to the 
occurrence of a hazardous systems state.”  A hazard is defined as a “state or set of 
conditions of a system (or an object) that, together with other conditions in the 
environment of the system (or object), will lead inevitably to an accident (loss event)” 
(Leveson, 1995).  This work applies to hazard type software engineering risks as well as 
all others. 
Additionally, and perhaps less typically considered is the view that a risk should 
also be viewed as an entity that possesses attributes. An example of an attribute that a risk 
possesses pertinent to the focus of this work is the probability that it will occur.  Another 
attribute a risk possesses is the effect its occurrence will have on individuals, entities, and 
the software engineering project itself. 
Viewing risks as distinct entities with specific and identifiable attributes justifies 
viewing them as tangible entities.  Tangible entities and their particular attributes may be 
measured. As a result, identified software engineering project risks can and should be 
viewed by software engineers as entities to be analyzed, measured and managed (Gluch, 
1994).  The purpose of the strategies implemented by software engineers to address and 
mitigate software project risks is primarily to help prevent these risks by anticipating 
their occurrence rather than reacting to them (Higuera, et al., 1994).   
As software engineers can and should view identified software engineering 
project risks as measurable and manageable entities with identifiable and measurable 
attributes these attributes should be discussed. Opinions vary somewhat within the field 
of software engineering on this subject but a number of risk attributes are generally 
considered to be typical.  These attributes are considered worthy of measurement, 
analysis, and management in the context of a software engineering project. Three risk 
attributes will be discussed as they are pertinent to this work and its goal of determining 
the viability of using quantitative values instead of qualitative values for measuring risk 
probability of occurrence.  These attributes are the source of the software engineering 
project risk, the context in which it exists, and as previously mentioned, its probability of 
occurrence. 
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The source of an identified project risk is the aspect of the software engineering 
project whose existence brings the risk with it.  An example of an identified software 
engineering project risk’s source could be an employee whose retention is important to 
the success of the project. While the employee is an asset to the project, the loss of the 
employee is a risk.   
An identified software engineering project risk’s context is the environment in 
which the risk exists.  The attributes of this environment may be dynamically changing 
throughout the course of the software engineering project.  An example of an identified 
project risk’s context is the organization in which a software engineering project is being 
undertaken.   
Probability of occurrence is defined as the likelihood of a risk actually occurring 
during the course of a software engineering project. Qualitative values such as “high” are 
sometimes assigned to assess the probability of occurrence of an identified project risk in 
the field of software engineering. Quantitative values such as “.7” are also used. 
There are several types of risks that software engineers must manage during the 
course of a software engineering project.  Edmund Conroe, the founder and owner of 
Acquisition and Technology Associates cites several “key risk issues” in his IEEE 
Software journal article “Implementing Risk Management on Software Intensive 
Projects.” Included among these risks are “excessive, immature, unrealistic, or unstable 
requirements,” “unrealistic cost or schedule estimates and/or allocated amounts,” and the 
use of “immature” technologies.    
Software engineers may be charged with measuring risks whose occurrence could 
result in the loss of human life or other types of casualties. Safety-critical software 
engineering requires that a rigorous approach to risk management being undertaken, 
including the accurate measurement of identified risks’ respective probabilities of 
occurrence.  An example of safety-critical software is an embedded software application 
that is used to control and regulate the hardware for a medical device that sustains human 
life.  A respirator or other life support type system must function predictably and to its 
specifications and also handle exceptional conditions in an acceptable manner as human 
lives may depend upon it.  Another example of safety-critical software is that used for the 
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navigation of commercial, private or government (such as military) aircraft. 
Unpredictable behavior from this type of software could result in individuals being 
injured or losing their lives.   
As has been previously mentioned in brief, software engineers have two types of 
scales at their disposal for the measurement of probability of occurrence of identified 
software engineering project risks. The quantitative probabilistic scale used in the field of 
software engineering for identifying the probability of an identified project risk actually 
occurring employs a numeric value.  This is a value between 0 and 1 with the value 0 
indicating that there is no probability of the risk occurring and the value 1 indicating that 
the risk will occur.  A probability of occurrence value such as .5 that is applied to an 
identified project risk indicates that the likelihood of the risk actually occurring is 50%.  
It should be noted that quantitative probabilistic scales may be referred to as “ordinal” 
scales in the software engineering discipline. 
Alternatively, probability of occurrence scales employing qualitative adjective 
values rather than quantitative numeric value measurements are sometimes used in the 
field of software engineering.  These scales may consist of a varied number of degrees 
and utilize qualitative, descriptive terms such as "high,” "medium,” "low,” etc., to 
indicate the probability of an identified software engineering project risk actually 
occurring.  Each of these terms may or may not have a stricter and more meaningful 
definition to the software engineering organization and software engineers utilizing them.  
An example of a software engineering organization that has implemented the use 
of qualitative values that have more clearly defined meanings to describe the likelihood 
of identified project risk occurrences is NASA’s Software Assurance Technology Center 
(SATC).  SATC utilizes a probability of occurrence scale containing the values “Low,” 
“Medium,” and “High” with each value having a specific qualitative meaning (Hyatt, et 
al., 1996).  Table 1 illustrates the specific meanings of these values to the software 





Table 1.   NASA Software Assurance Technology Center Identified Project Risk 
Probability of Occurrence Scale 
 
Probability Of Occurrence 
of Identified Project  
Risk 
Definition of Probability of Occurrence Value 
Low Very likely to meet objectives if current trend continues.  
Does not need contingency plans. 
Medium Based on current trend, likely to meet objectives.  Should 
have contingency plans. 
High Not likely to meet objectives based on current trend.  
Implement contingency plan immediately. 
 
The authors of the NASA report that discusses the SATC’s qualitative probability 
of occurrence scale state that “It would be nice to be numeric and quantify the risk and 
probability of occurrence, the state of the art does not currently permit this.” 
The Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) proposes a similar 
method for qualitatively measuring the probability of occurrence of identified software 
development project risks.  Their Software Risk Evaluation (SRE) v. 2.0 method also 
contains three qualitative values for measurement but uses a quantitative numeric value to 
represent each (Williams, et al., 1999) and is illustrated below.   
  
Table 2.   Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute Software Risk Evaluation 
Method v. 2.0  Identified Project Risk Probability of Occurrence Scale 
 
Probability 
of Occurrence of Identified 
Project Risk 
Definition of Probability of Occurrence Value 




This qualitative probability of occurrence measurement scale is less detailed and 
more subjective than the measurements used by NASA’s SATC.  More specific and 
practical meanings of the qualitative values “Very likely,” “Probable,” and “Improbable” 
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relative to the context of a software engineering project are not provided as they are in the 
NASA SATC’s qualitative probability of occurrence scale. No attempt at quantifying or 
providing a more detailed qualitative meaning for each of the probability of occurrence 
values is made with the Software Risk Evaluation Method v.2.0.  Software engineers 
could interpret these qualitative values in any number of ways.  Vague qualitative values 
such as these inaccurately measure the probability of occurrence of identified software 
engineering risks as they represent, at best, educated guesses.  These qualitative values 
could also be applied to identified software engineering project risks in an arbitrary 
manner such that their inaccuracy is a detriment to the project.  
An example of a “quantitative” probability of occurrence measurement is 
presented by Barry Boehm in the IEEE Software journal article “Software Risk 
Management: Principles and Practices.”  The article refers to the probability of 
occurrence measurement scale discussed as quantitative. This is qualified by Boehm’s 
statement that, “As with most other decision-analysis quantities, is the problem of making 
accurate input estimates of the probability.”  The “quantitative” measurements for 
identified software engineering project risks proposed by Boehm are excerpted from his 
article and are illustrated below. 
 
Table 3.   Excerpt From Barry Boehm IEEE Software Article “Software Risk 
Management: Principles and Practices” 
 
Quantification of Probability of Occurrence of Identified Project Risks 
Probability 
of Occurrence of Identified 
Project Risk 









Boehm’s measurement of the probability of occurrence of identified software 
engineering project risks uses descriptive qualitative values to measure their probability 
of occurrence.  A range of quantitative values defines each qualitative value that more 
clearly defines the meaning of each of the qualitative values in the scale.  
While this probability of occurrence system of measure is more clearly and easily 
understood than the two previous examples it is not quantitative. This system of 
measurement is a combination of qualitative and quantitative measurements.  This is 
because the qualitative terms “Frequent,” “Probable,” and “Improbable” are used.  These 
and other qualitative terms used to measure the probability of occurrence of identified 
software engineering project risks are open to the individual and subjective 
interpretations of the software engineers and software engineering project managers using 
them. 
Additionally, the quantitative numeric values employed in Boehm’s probability of 
occurrence measurement system are not derived through scientific methods.  Like the two 
previous examples, the measurements are obtained through methods that represent, at 
best, educated guesses.  Boehm’s estimates are however perhaps of greater value than the 
previously presented probability of occurrence scales as they are more clearly defined.  
The fact that Boehm qualifies the accuracy of the probability of occurrence 
measurements with the caveat that the input estimates are problematic is of benefit. This 
qualification makes it clear that the reader should not understand them to be derived 
through purely scientific methods and view the measurements as absolutely sound. 
Elaine M. Hall’s comprehensive book on risk management, “Managing Risk, 
Methods for Software Systems Development” proposes a method for quantifying the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks that is very 
similar to Boehm’s.  While there are some differences in the content of Boehm’s and 
Hall’s methods, including the fact that Hall’s contains a greater number of degrees of 
measure and is somewhat more detailed, the manner in which qualitative and quantitative 
values are combined to describe probabilities of occurrence are identical.  The problems 
this approach presents are identical to those outlined in the discussion of Boehm’s 
method for quantifying the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering 
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project risks and all apply to Hall’s method for quantifying the probability of occurrence 
for the same reasons they apply to Boehm’s. Hall’s method is illustrated below. 
 
Table 4.   Excerpt From Elaine M. Hall’s “Managing Risk, Methods for Software 
Systems Development” 
 
Probability Evaluation Criteria 
Probability 
 
Uncertainty Statement Evaluation 
> 80% Almost certainly, highly likely 5 
61-80% Probable, likely, probably, we believe 4 
41-60% We doubt, improbably, better than even 3 
21-40% Unlikely, probably not 2 
1-20% Highly unlikely, chances are slight 1 
 
Some important points are raised by the discussion of the Carnegie-Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute’s Software Risk Evaluation Method v. 2.0, Boehm’s 
quantification/qualification of probability of occurrence measurement techniques and 
Hall’s probability evaluation criteria method. A quantitative system for measuring the 
probability of occurrence of identified risks need use quantitative values only to measure 
the probability of occurrence of project risks.  A value such as .2 assigned to an identified 
software development project risks to measure its probability of occurrence indicates a 
20% chance that the risk will actually occur.  A value of .7 indicates a 70% chance that 
the identified risk whose probability of occurrence is being measured will occur.  These 
quantitative numeric values need not be combined with some qualitative adjective or 
adjectives describing the probability of occurrence of the identified risk.   
If the numeric values used to measure the probability of occurrence of identified 
risks are derived through sound scientific methods such as statistical and/or probabilistic 
methods the addition of qualitative adjectives to their value degrades their accuracy and 
meaning.  Qualitative adjectives should not be combined with scientifically derived 
numeric values to measure the probability of occurrence of identified software 
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engineering project risks.  As has been previously discussed, qualitative terms are open to 
the individual and subjective interpretations of the software engineers using them. 
Qualitative adjectives only serve to confuse the otherwise clear meaning of quantitative 
numeric measurement values when used in combination with them.   
By the same token, qualitative descriptive values do not lend themselves to being 
described with quantitative values.  The quantitative measurement “high” that is assigned 
to an identified software engineering project risk’s probability of occurrence can be 
interpreted as a quantitative value by software engineers in a number of ways.  Some 
software engineers may interpret the value as a probability of occurrence higher than 
50% and lower than 100%.  If the occurrence of the risk will have a large negative impact 
on the software engineering project some software engineers may deliberately interpret 
the definition of “high” as a probability of occurrence that is higher than 90%.  In so 
doing they will be assured that risk mitigation resources are heavily focused upon the 
identified project risk.  
The quantitative and qualitative types of techniques for measuring the probability 
of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks should not be used in 
combination. Qualitative measurement systems seem to benefit somewhat from their 
measurement values being more clearly defined with quantitative numeric values but 
more detailed qualitative descriptions of the practical meaning of each value is more 
appropriate. 
Quantitative numeric probability of occurrence measurement systems are 
degraded when combined with qualitative, descriptive attempts at furthering their 
definitions.  There is no need to qualitatively describe the meaning of a numeric 
probability of occurrence value that is derived through scientific methods. 
Accurately assessing the probability of occurrence of identified project risks is 
important to implementing sound software engineering practices. Roger L. Van Scoy 
states in the 1992 Software Engineering Institute report “Software Development Risk: 
Opportunity, Not Problem” that “Until we use a disciplined and systematic way to 
identify and confront technical risk, we will never be able to control the quality, cost, or  
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schedule of our software products.” The creators of the Software Risk Evaluation v.2.0 
method apparently did not consider Van Scoy’s advice when developing their probability 
of occurrence measurement scale. 
There are numerous uses for the probability of occurrence value of identified 
project risks that are quite valuable and of great consequence relative not only to the 
respective projects on which they exist but also to the field of software engineering as a 
whole.  A common application of the probability of occurrence value measurement is as a 
variable in the risk severity formula (Software Technology Support Center, 2005).  This 
formula may be referred to in slightly different terms depending upon the software 
engineering project or published work in which it is being used and/or discussed as may 
the variables in the equation but the meanings of these are identical. This formula is often 
used within the field of software engineering and referred to in numerous risk 
management related and other published software engineering works and is described by 
the equation: 
 
z = ab 
where 
z = risk severity 
a = probability of occurrence 
b = potential negative impact 
 
The variable z, risk severity, is defined as the “seriousness” of the risk by the 
Software Technology Support Center.  The variable a is the probability of the risk 
actually occurring and is defined in the same manner as has been discussed in this work.  
The variable b, the potential negative impact, is a measure of monetary, schedule, or 
project performance impact that is expected to be incurred should the identified risk 
actually occur.   
As has been previously demonstrated and discussed, the value of the probability 
of occurrence variable in this equation is not likely derived through rigorous 
mathematical techniques and/or historical project post-mortem data but through methods 
that are often heavily or entirely dependent upon intuitive or purely arbitrary means that 
are counter to sound scientific method.  The “Understanding Risk Management” article 
cited above from which the risk severity formula was taken provides no guidance on how 
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to derive the probability of occurrence variable.  One might fairly assume that as with the 
previously discussed examples of probability of occurrence scales the value of the 
probability of occurrence variable is expected to be derived with a single or combination 
of approaches that entail the use of intuition, guesswork, and/or a method invented by the 
software engineering organization who wishes to apply the formula to calculate the 
severity of the risks it has identified on its projects.   
These approaches to deriving the value of the probability of occurrence of an 
identified software engineering project risk are employed and advocated (through 
insinuation when no method for derivation is recommended) despite the fact that, as was 
illustrated in the previous example of how the value may be applied on an actual software 
engineering project, it is frequently quite important to effective project risk management. 
The probability of occurrence of a risk also frequently plays a key role in the processes 
used by the members of a project’s  leadership to decide how project resources for and 
within risk management programs are allocated. This may also mean that the success of 
the project is at least somewhat dependent upon the efficacy of the method used to derive 
the probability of occurrence value for each identified project risk.  In the context of a 
safety-critical project the importance of the probability of occurrence values of identified 
risks is of even greater concern as effective risk management is an activity that is vital to 
the prevention of the software system being produced causing loss of human life and/or 
casualty once it is in use. 
  
 13
II. JUSTIFICATION OF WORK 
There are a number of benefits to quantitatively and accurately assessing the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks.  There is also a 
substantial amount of evidence and number of experts in the field of software engineering 
supporting the notion that accurately assessing the probability of occurrence of identified 
software engineering project risks is a necessity.  Assessing the probability of occurrence 
of identified risks is not a discipline that may be taken lightly or viewed as optional by 
software engineers during the course of a software engineering project.  
The viability and ultimate success of the strategies employed by software 
engineers to mitigate identified risks depends on the measurements that describe the 
attributes of risks. Accuracy is an important key to successful risk management and also 
important to the overall success of the software engineering project.   
Inaccurate measurements may result in wasted project resources such as project 
funding and/or unexpected risk occurrences.  Overestimating the likelihood that a risk 
will occur may result in software engineering project management resources being over-
expended and wasted to mitigate identified risks.  Underestimating the probability of 
occurrence of identified software engineering project risks may result in unexpected 
occurrences of risks that may be expensive both in monetary terms and to the overall 
success of the software development project (Charette, 1991).   
The importance of applying accurate measurements to identified software 
engineering project risks cannot be understated.  Boehm and Demarco state that 
developing “metrics and tools for reasoning about risk management’s return-on-
investment issues” is important to the discipline of “fully effective software risk 
management” (Boehm, et al., 1997).  The “return-on-investment” issues they are 
speaking of are the same types of cost effectiveness/project resource management issues 
related to risk management that Charette cites.  In addition, software engineering project 
risk management techniques have been shown in scientific case study to produce cost 
benefit returns (Freimut, et al., 2001). 
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There are additional issues software engineers should consider with regard to the 
importance of accurately assessing the probability of occurrence of identified software 
engineering project risks. In 1995, an estimated $59 billion dollars was spent by 
American companies on cost overruns for software engineering projects.  That same year, 
another $81 billion dollars was expended by private sector companies in the US on 
canceled software engineering projects (Keil, et al., 1998). 
It should be clear that this work’s goal of investigating the viability of accurately 
quantifying the probability of occurrence may be of some importance to the field of 
software engineering and has the potential to advance the state of the discipline. 
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III. PRESENTATION OF WORK   
The viability of the field of software engineering using quantitative values 
exclusively to measure the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering 
project risks instead of qualitative values should be investigated. Qualitative values such 
as “High” should not be used to describe the probability of an identified software 
engineering project risk occurring when a more accurate and clearly defined value such 
as “.7” could be derived through scientific methods. 
It would appear that quantitative values are always better suited for the task of 
measuring the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks.  
There is however a considerable amount of support for the use of qualitative scales within 
the field of software engineering that is based upon sound reason and logic.  It should be 
noted that support for the use of qualitative scales for measuring the probability of 
occurrence of identified software engineering project risks does not necessarily mean that 
the software engineer voicing his or her support is entirely in favor of the exclusive use of 
one type of measurement over the other. 
Robert Charette advances a rather straightforward view in support of the use of 
qualitative scales to measure the probability of occurrence of identified software 
engineering project risks.  Charette states that a “major risk with risk analysis is that it 
often over-relies upon producing numbers, and does not rely enough upon human 
analysis and common sense to interpret the results. Similarly, the existence of competing 
analyses usually results in arguments ensuing over the analysis techniques, rather over 
what the results may be indicating.” (Charette, 1991).   
There are other opinions critical of the use of quantitative numerical values being 
applied to identified software engineering project risks to measure their probability of 
occurrence.  These include the view that numeric values may be just as subjective and 
inaccurate as qualitative values when used incorrectly and/or arbitrarily.  While 
quantitative values appear to be precise as they utilize numerical values rather than 
qualitative adjectives “Ordinal risk assessment scales are often incorrectly applied.  
Mathematical operations cannot be applied to scores obtained from uncalibrated ordinal 
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risk assessment scales. Risk values generated by mathematical operations on uncalibrated 
ordinal scales will almost always be meaningless and may hide true risk issues” (Conrow, 
et al., 1997).   
There is research-based evidence indicating that qualitative probability of 
occurrence measurements may be effective.  One study indicates that qualitative values 
may be effective in addressing the matter of measuring identified software engineering 
project risks when experienced project managers and technical staff members are brought 
together to decide upon and reach consensus on the probability of occurrence of such 
risks. Participants could choose from one of three qualitative values to indicate the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks.  These values 
were “High,” “Medium,” or “Low” (Kontio, et al., 1996).  This approach seems to be in 
line with Charette’s “human analysis and common sense” as it utilizes the experience of 
software engineers. 
Quantitative values are superior to qualitative adjectives for indicating the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks. As identified 
software engineering project risks are tangible entities with quantifiable attributes the use 
of quantitative values instead of qualitative for their measurement is viable.  It is however 
relatively difficult to scientifically derive quantitative values to indicate the probability of 
occurrence of identified software engineering project risks for a number of reasons. 
The intangible physicality of the products that software engineers are charged 
with creating results in engineering processes that contain a number of dynamic variables 
not found in other engineering disciplines.  More mature engineering disciplines that 
produce tangible products such as bridges, electrical circuits, or mechanical devices may 
often have more stable, “tried and true” engineering processes that better lend themselves 
to quantified measurement.  The tangibility of the products produced by these disciplines 
requires and encourages stable product specification.  The tangible nature of the products 
also requires the engineers of these products to more strictly adhere to specifications and 
other project requirements. 
Factors endemic and particular to the discipline of software engineering include 
the design and development of a product whose requirements and functionality may be 
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relatively easily redefined.  The processes currently employed to engineer software 
products are relatively immature in comparison to other engineering disciplines and there 
is not a large set of industry standard methods or software engineering project post-
mortem data available to software engineers. These sorts of standards and data would be 
useful in aiding software engineers in the establishment of a method for measuring the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks quantitatively. 
Qualitative measurements of the probability of occurrence of identified software 
engineering project risks are effective when the software engineers using them share a 
common understanding of the practical meaning of the qualitative adjectives being 
employed.  These definitions vary from organization to organization however and are 
largely subjective.  They are also derived from and dependent upon the particular 
processes and culture of each individual software engineering organization.  Additionally, 
the definitions and practical meaning of the probability of occurrence of identified 
software engineering project risk measurements used are not usually derived from 
quantified methods in these organizations but on the personal experience of their 
respective software engineers. As a result, these methods of qualitatively measuring the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks are not 
adaptable for use by all, if any, other software engineering organizations.   
The context, source, and other attributes of identified software engineering project 
risks directly influence their probability of occurrence singly or in combination. This 
influence is complex and often dynamic and irregular enough that the quantified 
measurement of these risk attributes through scientific methods is difficult.  The 
quantification of probability of occurrence of identified project risks clearly requires an 
advanced method that analyzes and considers all the factors that combine to influence 
their probability of occurrence.  
Charette’s emphasis on the importance of “human analysis and common sense” 
for risk management rather than scientific methodology indicates that a method for 
quantifying the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks 
is needed. The statement that the software engineering “state of the art does not currently 
permit” quantification of the probability of occurrence of risks made by the members of 
NASA’s SATC also supports this claim. 
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Charette’s “human analysis and common sense” can be effective for managing 
software engineering project risk and should be used by software engineers when 
methods for quantifying probability of occurrence are insufficient or nonexistent. 
However, quantified numeric values that are derived through scientific methods for 
indicating the probability of occurrence of identified project risks should be viewed as the 
ideal.   
As has been previously discussed, the probability of occurrence of an identified 
software engineering project risk is determined by the manner in which it is influenced by 
its attributes.  An identified software engineering project risk’s attributes are quantifiable 
and combine to determine its probability of occurrence.  As the engineering processes 
and other attributes of individual software engineering organizations vary, so too will the 
manner in which the attributes of identified software engineering project risks combine to 
determine their probability of occurrence.  
The engineering processes and other attributes of a software engineering 
organization influence the specific attributes of the identified project risks that determine 
their respective probabilities of occurrence.  Additionally, the attributes of the software 
engineering organizations themselves may be attributes of identified project risks. 
Examples of software engineering organization attributes could be its software 
engineering processes, risk management procedures, the technology or technologies it 
works with, and its size. 
Any method for quantifying the probability of occurrence of risks must account 
for and quantify the degree and manner in which each of the individual attributes of a 
given risk combines to determine its probability of occurrence.  The attributes of a risk 
may combine in a way that influences its probability of occurrence in a manner that is 
greater or less than the sum of its individual attributes.  Additionally, the method must 
also consider the dynamic nature of these attributes and facilitate appropriate revisions to 




Quantifying the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering 
project risks requires consideration of the fact that certain attributes of identified risks 
may influence probability of occurrence more than others. As an example, the probability 
of occurrence of a key employee leaving a software engineering project is likely to be 
heavily influenced by the attribute of the employee’s salary and whether it is competitive 
for the job market. The employee’s health is another attribute of the risk that influences 
its probability of occurrence. If the employee is in good health this attribute will not 
likely increase the risk’s probability of occurrence to as great or any degree than if the 
employee’s health were poor.   
Statistical software engineering project post-mortem data coupled with 
conditional probabilistic (including Bayesian) mathematical techniques could also be 
useful in the creation of a method for quantifying the probability of occurrence of 
software engineering project risks.  Post-mortem data collected from a number of 
software engineering organizations could be used to help establish a universal method for 
accurately quantifying the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering 
project risks.  Individual software engineering organizations utilizing the method could 
also utilize their own project postmortem data to tailor the risk probability of occurrence 
quantification method for their organization. 
More specifically, the field of conditional probability, including a consideration of 
the Bayesian effect upon conditional probability, provides methods for quantifying the 
probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks.  These methods 
can accommodate Charette's “human analysis and common sense” as well as “hard” 
statistical data (including software engineering project post-mortem data) and these two 
types of methods may be used in conjunction with one another.   
The following discussion of conditional probability and the Bayesian effect is 
preceded by an introduction to some basic concepts of probability.  Though this 
discussion draws from R. Lyman Ott’s “An Introduction to Statistical Methods and Data 
Analysis, Fourth Edition” the formulas and concepts discussed are common knowledge 
within the field of mathematics and areas in which they are often applied such as 
actuarial science. The examples are original to this work to illustrate how the techniques 
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may be adopted and applied to quantify the probability of occurrence of identified project 
risks within the field of software engineering. 
A. CLASSICAL AND BAYESIAN PROBABILITY THEORY 
An introductory type discussion of probability and terms related to the field that 
does not assume the reader is familiar with the topic should be undertaken to afford a 
basis for the discussion of how it may be applied to quantify the probability of occurrence 
of identified software engineering project risks.  Three definitions of probability will be 
discussed in this introduction to probability. 
The first definition of probability that will be discussed is the classical 
interpretation of probability which was derived from games of chance.  Classic examples 
are those that involve observations related to determining the probability of a coin toss 
such as “there is a 50% chance the toss will produce a result of ‘heads’.”  Another is 
related to the probability of drawing a card such as the ace of spades from a deck.  As 
there is only one ace of spades in a deck of cards, which contains 52 cards, the 
probability of drawing the ace of spades is 1/52 or approximately 2%.  Relative to the 
classical interpretation of probability definition, an outcome is the term used to describe 
each possible unique result and an event is the term used to describe a collection of 
outcomes. 
The classical interpretation of probability states that the probability of occurrence 
for an event E is determined by the ratio of the number of outcomes that are in favor of 
event E, Ne, over the total number of outcomes that are possible, N.  This may also be 
described as: 
 
P(event E) = Ne / N  
 
The classical interpretation of probability assumes that and depends on all 
outcomes being equally likely.  If this assumption does not hold to the instance to which 
it is being applied the resulting probabilities will be erroneous.   
The second of the three definitions of probability that are being discussed is an 
empirical, or experience based, approach that is defined and referred to with what is 
called the relative frequency concept.  This definition of probability states that the 
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probability of occurrence of an event E is determined by the ratio of ne, which is the 
number of times E occurs in an experiment, over n, which is the number of times that the 
experiment is conducted.  This may also be described as: 
 
P(event E) ≈ ne / n   
 
This definition of probability produces an approximate result as it is derived 
through the observation of several repetitions of the entity being observed.  In this case 
this is the event E. 
The third and final definition of probability that is discussed in this work is 
referred to as the subjective or personal probability.  As its name implies, this definition 
of probability involves individuals making subjective/personal judgments about the 
probability of occurrence of an event which can vary from person to person and cannot 
be verified. This is identical or quite similar to the previously presented examples of 
methods that are typically used to quantify the probability of occurrence of identified 
project risks within the field of software engineering such as Hall’s Probability 
Evaluation Criteria.   
There are some properties of probabilistic calculations that should be discussed. 
One of these that has been previously discussed in brief is that the probability of event A 
or P(A) will always be a value greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1.  This 
may be restated as P(A) will always lie in the interval from 0 (this means that there is no 
probability of the event occurring) to 1 (this means that the event will definitely occur) or 
as: 
 
0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1 
 
Another property states that two events A and B are mutually exclusive if the 
occurrence of the events eliminates the probability of occurrence of the other event.  In 
other words, A and B are mutually exclusive if the occurrence of A makes it impossible 
for B to occur. 
It follows that if A and B are mutually exclusive the probability of either event A 
or B occurring is: 
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P(either A or B) = P(A) + P(B) 
 
The complement of an event is the event not occurring.  In other words, the 





It follows that the sum of the probability of event A, P(A) and the probability that 
event A will not occur P(Ā) is 1.  This may also be represented as: 
 
P(A)  +  P(Ā) = 1 
 
It may seem that this sum should be zero but an example should make this 
property clearer.  Consider a coin toss experiment that uses two coins.  If numerous 
repetitions of tossing the two coins indicates that the probability of occurrence of the 
results being “two heads,” which may be though of as event A, is .75 then the probability 
of another outcome whose results are not “two heads,” or event Ā is .25.  The sum of 
these two values is 1. 
The union of two events A and B is defined as the set of all outcomes that are 
included in either A or B or both A and B.  This is represented symbolically as: 
A U B 
The intersection of two events A and B is defined as the set of all outcomes that 
are included in both A and B.  This is represented symbolically as: 
 
A ∩ B 
 
The probability of the union of two events A and B is: 
 
P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B) – P(A ∩ B) 
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As an introductory discussion to probability has been undertaken the definition of 
conditional probability may now be discussed.  The conditional probability of nonzero 
probability of occurrence event A given nonzero probability of occurrence event B is 
defined as: 
 
P(A|B)  =  P(A ∩ B) / P(B) 
 
Event A could be used to represent the event of occurrence of an identified 
software engineering project risk whose probability is influenced by the known 
probability of occurrence of the event B.  The previously discussed influence of various 
factors on the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project risks is 
described in a simplistic way by the formula above with the probability of occurrence of 
one event being influenced by the known probability of occurrence of another.  A more 
sophisticated application of the conditional probability of occurrence formula above 
could be useful in quantifying the probability of occurrence of identified software 
engineering project risks. 
Additionally, the conditional probability of event B given event A is: 
 
P(B|A) = P(A ∩ B) / P(A) 
 
The definition of conditional probabilities above allows the multiplication law to 
be defined, this is: 
The probability of the intersection of two events A and B is: 
 
P(A ∩ B)  =  P(A)P(B|A) 
      =  P(B)P(A|B) 
 
The difference between these two definitions lies in what needs to be calculated 
and what is known.  If  P(A ∩ B) and P(A) are known, P(B|A) can be calculated.  P(A ∩ 
B) can be calculated if P(A) and P(B|A) are known. 
Baye’s Theorem allows conditional probabilities to be updated as is needed 
and/or possible. This means that data regarding the probability of occurrence of a risk, 
such as a software engineer of a given level of experience leaving a project, could be 
 24
collected  and/or  derived for  each project  while it is underway and used  in  conjunction 
with the probability of occurrence data that was derived from several software 





If A1, …, Ak are mutually exclusive states of nature and if B1, …, Bm are m possible 
mutually exclusive observable events, then 
 
P(Ai|Bj)  =  P(Bj|Ai)P(Ai)  /  P(Bj|A1)P(A1) + P(Bj|A2)P(A2) + … + P(Bj|Ak)P(Ak) 
   =  P(Bj|Ai)P(Ai)  /  ∑i P(Bj|Ai)P(Ai,) 
 
Baye’s Theorem considers some number k of underlying events A1, …, Ak which 
may be referred to as states of nature.  The unconditional probabilities P(A1), …, P(Ak), 
which may be referred to as prior probabilities, are defined.  The mutually exclusive 
possible events, also sometimes called observable events are B1, …, Bm.  Also specified 
are P(Bi|Ai), which are the conditional probabilities of each observable event given each 
state of nature.  P(Bi|Ai) are also referred to as likelihoods. 
The potential for expounding upon the definition of conditional probability and 
applying it in a more sophisticated manner to address the numerous factors influencing 
the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering risks is realized with a 
consideration of the Bayesian effect upon such calculations.  Baye’s Theorem can be 
used with statistical sample data and/or experience-based, intuitive probabilistic values 
(e.g., those derived with Charette's “human analysis and common sense”) to update 
conditional probabilities. This could be effective in applying the previously discussed 
software engineering project postmortem data to help achieve a more accurate 
quantification of the probability of occurrence of identified software engineering project 
risks and is investigated below. 
B. APPLYING BAYE'S THEOREM  
A consideration of the hypothetical yet plausible and perhaps commonplace 
scenario of a high profile software engineering project being planned whose success is 
critical to the future of a software engineering organization will be used to illustrate how 
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the probability of occurrence of a project risk may be achieved with Baye's Theorem. The 
software engineering organization’s leadership may wish to mitigate software engineer 
attrition type problems that have occurred on past projects as their impact on the project 
may have a “ripple effect” on other aspects of the project.  This could include adverse 
effects upon schedule, budget, productivity, etc.  More specifically, past software 
engineering projects may have been put severely behind schedule and also perhaps failed 
due to software engineering personnel with senior level experience leaving the 
organization prior to their completion.  
The software engineering project’s leadership decides to take a more proactive 
and scientific approach to risk management on this project and create a risk management 
plan. One of the items outlined in the personnel related risk portion of this plan may 
recommend that to prevent the same types of schedule slippages that have been caused by 
the loss of software engineering personnel with senior level experience in the past the 
organization should immediately and aggressively recruit a replacement for each of these 
individuals if and when they decide to leave the project.   
In order to ascertain how much funding should be allocated for any possible 
future recruitment effort for the project (monies will be required for advertising, time 
spent interviewing candidates, etc.) the project’s leadership may like to know the 
probability of occurrence for the risk of a software engineer with senior level experience 
leaving the project due to a conflict with their supervisor. 
The project’s leadership decides to use the project post-mortem data related to 
software engineer attrition that has been collected by the organization over the course of 
several years through automated and/or other relatively low resource-intensive means 
(see Section D Collecting and Applying Statistical Data for some discussion of some 
methods that may be employed to accomplish this). This data is related to several typical 
aspects of software engineering projects that have been undertaken in the past including 
the likelihood of a software engineer of a given experience level (junior, intermediate, or 
senior) leaving the organization after the start of a software engineering project to which 
they have been assigned.  A hypothetical compilation of this information is presented in 
Table 5 below.  The probabilities of occurrence for each software engineer expertise level 
are referred to as conditional probabilities or random variables. 
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Table 5.   Software Engineer Attrition Example Data  
 
                                        Software Engineer Level of Experience 
Reason for Employee Leaving 
Project 
Senior Intermediate Junior Total 
Conflict with Supervisor 7% 25% 55% 80% 
Dissatisfied with Software 
Engineering Standards and/or 
Process 
13% 20% 25% 60% 
Illness or Family-Related Issue 20% 50% 10% 85% 
Dissatisfied with Work Load 60% 5% 10% 75% 
 
Suppose that 15% of the staff is classified as having senior level software 
engineering expertise, 40% are intermediate level, and 45% are junior level. What is the 
probability that a software engineer with senior level expertise will quit the project due to 
a conflict with their supervisor? 
An application of Baye's Theorem provides: 
 
P(Senior|Conflict with Supervisor) =  
    P(Conflict with Supervisor|Senior|)P(Senior) / P(Conflict with Supervisor|           
    Senior)P(Senior) + P(Conflict with Supervisor|Intermediate)P(Intermediate)  
    + P(Conflict with Supervisor|Junior)P(Junior) 
    = (.07)(.15) / ((.07)(.15) + (.25)(.4) + (.55)(.45)) 
    = .03 
 
There is a 3% chance that a software engineer with senior level expertise will 
leave the project due to a conflict with their supervisor.   
This example illustrates how conditional probability may be applied to quantify 
the probability of occurrence for the identified software engineering risk of a software 
engineer with senior level experience leaving a project due to a conflict with their 
supervisor.  As has been previously noted, the data used to calculate the quantified 
probability of occurrence for this hypothetical project risk could have been collected from 
several software engineering projects over a period of time.  It is however also possible to 




the probability of occurrence of a risk) via Charette's “human analysis and common 
sense”/experience-based estimates.  The use of conditional probabilities that are derived 
through both methods and combined in a single model is another option. 
C. BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
Bayesian networks (Jensen, 2001), which may also be referred to as Bayesian 
Belief Nets (BBNs), or Belief Nets, make applying Baye's Theorem more convenient.  
Bayesian networks provide a graphical representation of probabilistic models as directed 
asynchronous graphs (DAGs) whose nodes represent the problem domain's conditional 
probabilities. This graphical representation aids in creating, maintaining, and 
understanding large and complex probabilistic models and has been applied successfully 
in other disciplines such as data mining, medicine, reliability analysis, and real-time 
weapon scheduling (Neopolitan, 2004).  
Another benefit of employing Bayesian networks for solving probability of 
occurrence type problems is that there are a number of good quality, “industrial strength” 
tools of commercial/proprietary, free, and open source types.  The free GeNIe/SMILE 
toolset (GeNIe & Smile, 2007) has been evaluated and compared with some other 
Bayesian network tools and selected to demonstrate the application of a Bayesian 
network. In addition to being freely available via the Internet and containing features that 
will often be of use to “real world” software engineers and/or software engineering 
project managers, the GeNIe/SMILE toolset is compatible with a number of other 
popular Bayesian network tools (including supporting their file formats), contains good 
quality tutorial and “help” documentation, and allows statistical data to be imported into 
Bayesian network models via databases and spreadsheets.  
To illustrate the application of Bayesian networks the software engineering 
attrition example that was discussed previously has been modeled with the 
GeNIe/SMILE toolset. Figure 1 illustrates the GeNIe/SMILE environment and the 
completed software engineer attrition model.  The images and discussion that follow it 








Figure 1.   GeNIe/Smile Toolset Environment with the Software Engineer Attrition 
Bayesian Network Model 
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Figure 2.   Properties of the “Software Engineering Staff By Experience Level” Node  
 
The three properties of the “Software Engineering Staff By Experience Level” 
node are shown in Figure 2 above along with their values. Recall that these values are 
taken from the previous example. The details of how to create a node with the 
GeNIe/SMILE platform may be found in its “help” documentation. 
The four properties of the “Reason for Software Engineer Leaving Project” node 
are shown in Figure 3 below along with their values. Recall that these values are taken 
from the previous example and based on the combinations in its table. Other details 
related how to create a Bayesian network with the GeNIe/SMILE platform, including its 
nodes, may be found in its “help” documentation.  The properties of the “Software 
Engineering Staff By Experience Level” node are also present as an arc has been created 




Figure 3.   Properties of the “Reason for Software Engineer Leaving Project” Node 
 
 
Figure 4.   The Completed Software Attrition Bayesian Network Model 
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The completed model in Figure 4 depicts the completed Bayesian network 
including its two nodes, “Software Engineering Staff By Experience Level” and “Reason 
for Software Engineer Leaving Project.”  As with the other illustrations, these nodes are 
displayed as “bar charts” to show their properties. The arc, or arrow (which are referred 
to as “arcs” in directed asynchronous graphs), from the “Software Engineering Staff By 
Experience Level” node to the “Reason for Software Engineer Leaving Project” node 
indicates that a software engineer's level of expertise influences the particular reasons a 
software engineer leaves a project.   
The “Conflict with Supervisor” attribute has a value of 100% as it has been 
selected as the “evidence” value of the node, or the value that is of particular concern for 
the probabilistic problem at hand.  After setting the node's evidence value, the 
probabilities for each level of software engineering level expertise leaving a project due 
to a conflict with their supervisor is displayed by selecting the “Update” command icon.  
Details related how to create a Bayesian network with the GeNIe/SMILE platform, 
including the details of how to perform the activities described in this section, may be 
found in the toolset's “help” documentation. 
D. COLLECTING AND APPLYING STATISTICAL DATA 
While experience and/or intuition may be used to derive conditional probabilities, 
“hard” statistical data may often be important for creating the nodes in Bayesian network 
probability of occurrence models.  This is important as it can help ensure that the 
probabilities of occurrence that are derived with Bayesian networks are based upon 
objective values and an organization's prior experience with the probabilities of risks 
which may be more likely to be accurate than those whose nodes are created with 
intuitive “guesstimates” (e.g., Charette's “human analysis and common sense”).  This 
section discusses collecting and applying statistical data to create Baysian networks.   
Spreadsheets and/or databases are commonplace tools that may often be found 
within software engineering organizations and may be used to collect statistical data.  
Free, open source varieties such as the Open Office Calc spreadsheet (Calc, 2007), Open 
Office Base database (Base, 2007), or the MySQL database (My SQL AB :: Developer  
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Zone, 2007)  may be used to help minimize the cost of collecting statistical data. Figure 5 
illustrates an example of an Open Office Calc spreadsheet that could be used to collect 
data for the software engineer attrition example. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Open Office Calc Spreadsheet That Could Be Used to Collect Data for the 
Software Engineer Attrition Example 
 
As with software engineering projects in general, it is important to identify, 
understand, and document the goals and requirements of a risk management program 
before implementing it.  This is especially true of risk management programs' statistical 
data collection components. It is equally important to document a detailed and precise 
plan for how these goals and requirements will be satisfied. Failure to thoroughly 
analyze, understand, and document a risk management program's requirements, including 
its statistical data requirements, at its inception and approaching these in an ad hoc 
manner can, and likely will, result in a large amount of wasted time and effort.  
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Additionally, this could cause the risk management program to (perhaps justifiably) be 
viewed as wasteful and ineffective and/or fail before it has been afforded sufficient time 
to mature and realize its potential efficacy. 
As a brief example of how a software engineering organization could undertake 
the collection of statistical data it could first list the software engineering project risks 
whose probability of occurrence it wishes to quantitatively measure.  The next step would 
be to identify the factors that influence these risks' respective probabilities of occurrence 
(i.e. the problem domain's conditional probabilities). When undertaking this step it is 
important to recognize that a conditional probability can influence the probability of 
occurrence of more than one identified risk. As an example, a software engineer's level of 
expertise may not only influence their reason for leaving a project. It can also influence 
other software engineering project risks such as the probability that a project will not 
meet its deadline or will exceed its budget.  By the same token, the probability of 
occurrence of these risks could also be influenced by the factors that influence software 
engineers leaving a project.  The practical means of collecting data, including the tool(s) 
that will be used, should also be discussed along with what project stakeholders are 
responsible for this. 
The GeNIe/SMILE toolset aids the application of statistical data by providing 
support for the creation of Baysian networks with the data contained in several different 
types of databases and text files (e.g., spreadsheets in .csv format) .  Bayesian networks 
that are derived via this method are referred to as a “Learning” Bayesian networks and 
the GeNIe/SMILE toolsets' functionality could be used exclusively, or in conjunction 
with, “manual” methods for building probability of occurrence models (e.g., the method 
used for creating the previous software engineer attrition Bayesian network).  
As an example, a Bayesian network's nodes may be derived with the columns in a 
spreadsheet.  The rows of the spreadsheet represent the combinations of the states that 
exist between the nodes.  The toolsets' help documentation contains some more detailed 
information on this and includes some tutorials on how to undertake the creation of 
Learning Bayesian networks. 
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Finally, while “hard” statistical data can be quite valuable it is important to 
recognize that conditional probabilities that are derived through this means can, and 
sometimes should, be revised with Charette's “human analysis and common sense” 
during the course of a software engineering project if needed.  As an example, if there is 
a local influenza outbreak during the course of a software engineering project it may be 
wise to increase the probability of software engineers leaving due to an “illness or family 
related issue” by an amount that “seems about right.”  In other words, the impact of the 
influenza outbreak can be intuitively judged to estimate how much its influence will 
increase the probability of software engineers leaving the project even though no 
statistical data that can provide insight into this has been collected. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Bayesian networks may be used to quantitatively measure the probability of 
occurrence of any type of identified software engineering project risk and could be an 
important part of the “way forward” in the improvement of this measurement within the 
field of software engineering.  Bayesian networks allow all of the factors that are deemed 
to influence the probability of occurrence of a risk to be accounted for along with their 
respective degrees of influence. The probabilities of occurrence of conditional 
probabilities may be derived with the use of  “hard” statistical data and/or Charette's 
“human analysis and common sense.”  When experience and/or intuition is used to derive 
the probabilities of occurrence for Bayesian network node properties, a type of sharing of 
this experience and/or intuition in a quantitative way that should be relatively easy for 
others to understand and is not necessarily entirely dependent upon the individual culture 
of a particular software engineering project may occur.    
The practical matter of having a convenient means of applying Bayesian networks 
to quantify the probability of occurrence of risks within the typically tight time and/or 
cost constraints that exist on many software engineering projects is largely, if not 
entirely, solved by the fact that there is at least one good quality, free toolset that will 
likely meet the “real world” risk management needs of most software engineering 
projects (GeNIe/SMILE). Other Bayesian network tools should, however, be evaluated 
and compared to ensure that they meet users' needs. 
Bayesian networks seem to be an improvement upon the way that the 
measurement of the probability of occurrence of software engineering project risks is 
typically undertaken.  While worthy of serious consideration, it is important to recognize 
that they are not a Brooksian “silver bullet” (Brooks, 1995) or “magical solution” to this 
problem.  As with all statistical and probabilistic methods, the principle of “garbage in, 
garbage out” (or “GIGO”) applies to the use Bayesian networks. As an example, if the 
conditional probabilistic values that are used in a Bayesian network are inaccurate it is 




important to recognize that some practice and review of tutorials may often be necessary 
before modeling “real world” problem domains with Bayesian networks as their 
application is not necessarily intuitive or trivial.  
There are methods of applying Bayesian networks that are more sophisticated 
than what has been presented within this work's somewhat limited, investigative scope 
and some in-depth discussion and citation of these may be found in (Neopolitan, 2004). 
Finding ways to “borrow” established techniques from other applications of Bayesian 
networks is worthy of additional investigation as it could advance the measurement of the 
probability of occurrence of software engineering project risks with a relatively minimal 
investment of time and effort. 
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